'A major flaw of the EU institutional structure is that it is fundamentally undemocratic.'

The process of legislating within EC law appears to be quite complex. One of the reasons for this is that all the rules and procedures for legislating are laid down in the treaties at different points. Every EC law is based on a specific Treaty Article, in this case referred to as the legal basis of the legislation. The second reason is that there are different processes of legislating and the appropriate process depends on the particular area of the Treaty objectives that require legislating.

The process of legislating has been modified very significantly since the original treaties, as a result of the different subsequent treaties. The introduction of the new treaties arose from the criticism of the early legislative process that there was a so called democratic deficit, in other words that those institutions that existed on the basis of appointment rather then election controlled the processes. This democratic deficit was considered to be particularly true of the role of the Parliament which originally had little effect on the legislative process other then to suggest amendments.

The 3 institutions mainly involved in the legislative process are:

The commission (the body mainly responsible for proposing legislation and producing draft legislation)

Parliament (which either has a consultative role or in certain instances can propose amendments)

Council (the body that in effect is responsible for passing new legislation

Other institutions also play limited roles within the procedure, most notably COREPER, of course, which supports the council through all legislation.

There are 4 types of procedures that are available in the Community legal order. However, there are limited circumstances where the Commission is authorised to legislate on its own and there are other instances where the council and commission can act without consulting the parliament, although in practice they still do. The 4 main processes are:

The proposal (or consultation) procedure

The co-operation procedure

The co-decision procedure

The process of assent.

The proposal procedure was the original procedure but because of criticism that there was lack of sufficient accountability and the democratic deficit a new process was introduced to give the parliament a more meaningful role. This procedure was the co-operation procedure. It was introduced to provide a relatively straightforward means of involving the European parliament, which would have 2 readings of the draft proposals. It is also based on qualified majority voting by the Council and its main context was for internal marketing measures. However, use of this process has for the most part been removed by the treaty of Amsterdam and now only survives in respect of Economic Monetary Union (EMU)

The predominant process nowadays was then introduced. This is the co-decision procedure. Although initially highly complex, it has been subsequently modified by the Treaty of Amsterdam for the sake of simplification. Use of this procedure has been expanded by the Treaty of Nice and the EU constitution envisages even more widespread use.

Finally the assent procedure is similar to the co-decision procedure. The most significant difference between the procedures is the involvement of parliament. Under the consultation procedure for instance, Parliament only gives its opinions on draft legislation. By contrast, in the co-decision procedure Parliament in effect shares power with the council and has much more influence over legislation.

The proposal procedure most accurately represents the notion that it is the Commission that proposes and the Council that disposes. Nevertheless the process still depends on some consultation with parliament as well as the Economic And Social Committee or the Committee of regions, and discussions with Coreper. Failure genuinely to consult may amount to a breach of essential procedural requirement. On this basis it may result in the measure being declared void. The importance was recognised by the ECJ in Roquette Freres SA v Council (case 138/79) [1980] ECR 3333.

The process involves the commission sending its proposal to Council and Parliament, as well as one of the committees if appropriate. The measure cannot become law until parliament has delivered its opinion. Even so council has the final say.

' this... is undermined somewhat by the fact that there is no requirement that the council actually take account of the parliament's opinion, nor indeed, give any reason for rejecting it. Thus in the context of the consultation procedure, the parliament may not force its opinion on the council as a lower house could in most...systems'

S Douglas Scott. Constitutional Law of the EU (Longman 2002), p118.

So this was more justification that there was a democratic deficit in the administration and law making of the EC

The co-operation procedure was introduced by the Single European Act (SEA) in order to give a greater role to parliament.

Following the recent expansion of the EU in relation to number of member states, there is increasing pressure to overcome complexities of its institutional decision making procedures in relation to the growing perception of a democratic deficit. That there is internal reflection on this concern is not at all in doubt, but to what extent does this deficit affect the Union, members and individuals and where exactly can one allocate the deficit within the EU institutional structure. Furthermore, this essay seeks to find a standpoint in relation to the EU's ability to adapt to the transitional array of social, political and even global processes directly influencing the EU democratic process.

In order to efficiently proceed with the discussion of democratic deficit in the EU one must consider the purposes and the roles of the institutions within. Calls for a unified Europe can be traced back to the collapse of the roman empire. The modern day unification was a measure taken in order to prevent the possibility of future wars with the initial focus of the EU on trade and economy. Winston Churchill aptly stated We must build a kind of United States of Europe in a post war speech to academic youths in Zurich. However, with its expansion in scope of the EU's mandate together with the joining of more member states, inaptness has indeed developed between popular democratic representation and expansion.

Whether perceived or real, the arguments of a so called democratic deficit is in principal due to the EU's institutional architecture which promotes a type of circulatory decision making process permitting little input from the European public sphere. To add to this, we have a soupcon of informality in relation to the nature negotiations taking place in the midst of, and within the key policy making bodies of the EU. Collectively, this leads to a less then transparent and on occasion's unpredictable policy making process, a perfect environment for critics of the augment of a democratic deficit within the EU. An analysis of the institutional structure is thus needed to satisfy an ingrained understanding of the so called democratic deficit.

The similarity between national and multi national European governing procedures is that each is assigned with directing opinion, and in due course ,policy and resources into a common field. It can be said that power and influence within the EU structures are argued to be divided, although it argued that the separation of power and influence is somewhat unequal between the European Parliament(EP), the Council of Ministers and the Commission. These governing bodies are intended to keep checks and uphold a balance between each other. Within the member states, citizens have the opportunity to influence EU policy making through their elected officials. The closest the individual comes in directing a policy decision is through their elected representative to the European Parliament.

As noted, the EP has co-decision making authority with the Commission, it is somewhat limited as it lacks binding legislative authority. This practically means that candidates running for the EP may be able to put forth various ideas, however once the are in office, they no real expectations in relation to realising their plans.

[T]he EP itself has virtually no role in constitution making in the EU. The EP is reasonably important in terms of day-to-day policy making within the EU, of course. But it carries no weight in the discussion about the EU, since this is instead a matter for national politicians and national governments and, through these, for the Council and Commission.

Despite this, the EP is increasingly emphasizes itself and is becoming more vocal on matters it actually does have direct control over. This has been recently demonstrated through the disapproval of the newly appointed Commission Cabinet.

The Council of Ministers is composed of the member state representatives and is the main legislative and Decision making body of the EU. The Members of the Council have the necessary of their national parliament to make policy. However, the nature of its procedures is deemed almost surreptitious and is often cited to dwell in lack of adequate member state contribution. Distinctly, this introduces a insight of democratic deficiency within the works of the Council.

With the exception of Denmark and Austria, member states do not allow their national parliaments to exact commitments from ministers before Council meetings, consult them during sessions, or hold them answerable afterward.

Additionally, the introduction of qualified majority voting empowers member state representatives in the Council to manipulate voting procedures to reach decisions. This may be according to compressed timeframes and therefore inevitably leads to blocking or vetoing of minority opinions within the Council at times.

Furthermore, with the introduction of qualified majority voting, member state representatives in the Council are further empowered to manipulate voting procedures, sometimes according to compressed timeframes, to reach a decision, inevitably leading at times to a blocking or veto of minority opinions within the Council.

Although the EP must give its approval to proposed legislature by the Council, internal veto powers between MEP's informally makes influence of decisions somewhat easier. Likewise, external veto powers of the Council erode the bedrock of effective decision making since member governments are unwilling to create a stalemate and accordingly use their veto power cautiously. It would therefore be safe to assume that the fundamental difference between national and multi national procedures may be entrenched less in a continuum of opinion but rather who classifies majority interest within national or multi national level spheres.

The commission is granted the power to draft laws and regulations for approval by the EP and Council and due to this power being bestowed upon them, they are seen to be the power house among the European institutions. Various portfolios concerning the authorization of different directorates within the Commission are held by European Commissioners chosen by member governments in consultation with the Commission president. The real drafting of laws takes place behind closed doors by the aptly named Eurocrats, who seldom venture into the territories where Commission polices may ultimately have direct influence. Due to this fact there is a perceived and somewhat materialized democratic deficit.

Instead of harmonizing and interacting with the opinions from the member states' public sphere which ultimately is to be reflected in the making of policy in Brussels, a huge influx of satellite organisations who claim to represent European opinion albeit within their respective fields, has somewhat flourished in the fields of Brussels. These satellites consist of consultants who are in regular contact with the special committees established to provide guidance on particular issues. The problem arises in the situation where they may be evenly out of touch with general opinion to the extent of their numerous counterparts in the Commission.

Due to the complex nature of the EU institutional relationships, citizens are often left perplexed and uninterested in matters concerning their access to rights. Local democracies provide more clarity of the definition where institutional relationships are concerned, often preserved by constitutions or likewise formal frameworks. On one hand, it is often argued that the public need to play a clearer role with greater involvement in decision making processes. This is a logical perception since the outcome of such decisions directly affects the public and public national interests. Contrastingly, the public are represented by elected officials who seldom confer with or question what part the public has to play. This is often defined as the permissive consensus. This process is referred to as such for the reason that Europe is too complex... or too technical, or perhaps even boring, to be of concern to ordinary voters, with the result that it is seen to become, by mutual consent, a matter for elites.

The shift from national to European governance, as argued by researchers, has lead to what is dubbed, a type of co-ordinated decentralisation. Furthermore, by changing the traditional method of decision making to accentuate the process itself over the institution, some have referred to the surfacing of a 'Faustian bargain'. A paramount example of this argument lies in the consensus nature of methods currently undertaken in the Council. Thus, for the sake of a broader agreement, accountability and effectiveness is limited. This creates great compromise between institutions within the union due to the informal nature of the decision making ultimately widening the gap between citizens and their representatives in the EU.

The type of multi-level governance practiced by the European Union is characterised by a technocratic system that includes transnational, national and sub-national institutions, and a wide variety of public and private actors. Negotiations and networks among the multi-level institutions are defined more by informal, behind the scenes relationships. Here relations are not hierarchically defined, but rather contextualised both at the vertical and horizontal levels. Rather than complementing or expanding on inter-governmental practices, the multi-level arrangement often deals directly with sub-national or local authorities. Some point to the effectiveness of separating the central, regional and local authorities into autonomous bodies, capable of creating autonomous linkages directly with the transnational institutions of the EU.

Yet these types of institutional networks have a way of allowing more powerful stakeholders to succeed over smaller, often less experienced and resourced agents. This is due to the lack of formal structure inherent in the negotiations among EU institutions and regional or local actors. With so many actors and institutions contributing to the EU process of policymaking, it becomes difficult to hold any one player accountable.

Internal solutions to combat criticism over the lack of democratic practice within EU institutions have failed to overcome the deficit, or address the underlying root causes. This was demonstrated by the recent appointment of a new Commissioner to deal with external communication issues. Aside from the fact that the new Commissioner was in fact an old commissioner, simply reassigned or re-commissioned, her main focus of attention in engaging the public sector centred on creating a dialogue or brainstorming with civic groups. This, it is inferred, would create the necessary link with the disgruntled and disconnected European citizens.

Yet, in common with many of the consulting firms and lobbying associations set up to influence policy in Brussels, many of these civic groups were directly financed largely by the commission. As one commentator points out, the Commission financially supports many organisations:

[...] partly because they are convenient interlocutors for the various policymaking directorates. Suppose the environment or social-affairs directorates are thinking of issuing new directives and want to be seen to take account of the views of European citizens. What could be easier that picking up the phone and arranging a meeting with the local (Commission-funded) NGO?

This, in turn, could lead to a rather stale or self-serving dialogue or brainstorming between the Commission and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that depend on the Commission for their financial lifeline.

Taking into account the diversity among the European member state populations, with their varying interests and needs, it must be conceded that representation of majority interests is unlikely to take place until a clearly defined European public space emerges. This will only happen once citizens, of both large and small member states, old and new, feel themselves plugged in to a process whose outcome they are able to influence and feel invested in. Among conceptual approaches that may be employed to bridge the perception of a democratic deficit, the following may offer a starting point:

First, effectiveness should be reinstated to a governance process spread too thin in order to house a diversity of players at the expense of preserving democratic principles and attaining effective resolutions to policy problems. Through the establishment of a legal framework, such as the constitutional development in progress, a rigid setting will be endorsed which, in turn, would authorize more equal representation of all partakers. Formal rules, entrenched in constitutional principles, would guarantee equality of representation for those concerned. This would defeat a major fault in the EU's governing structure, which is often more fixed on procedure than result, by illuminating the individual role of the EU's institutions to the public.

Also, in order to re-establish accountability and attend to the problems of transparency in EU institutions, the organization and progression of negotiations should be made formal, and less powerful players should be presented with institutional protection to guarantee their equitable representation. This is principally significant when bearing in mind the lack of access many citizens have due to the lack of practical awareness to commence efficient lobbying operations in the maze of the European institutions, in conjunction with the deficiency of resources and political associations. In order for this to happen, the rule of subsidiary should be fortified, in an attempt to expose the decision making process to all of members.

Furthermore, as a device to improve the tunnel vision phenomena experienced by numerous Eurocrats in the Commission, a cooperative substitution process in which Commission officials commit some period of time reassessing their fields of accountability from a national standpoint, ought to be established. While the Commission has the internship programme as a method for persons to gain knowledge of the domestic mechanism of its institutions by useful work practice, new civil servants ought to donate time in member states which are not their own, albeit within their field of abilities. This would permit civil servants a sense of familiarity with issues citizens come across, and relate these back in Brussels.

Ultimately, the need to incorporate a broader discussion for circulating data in relation to the EU's issues and procedure is paramount in order to establish public engagement. Mass media is an ideal device for this and is effectively utilized by anti-EU enemies.

A majority of the difficulties with public discernment of the EU can be related to the lack of information impending EU institutions. Conceivably in the past this may have been regarded as a valuable means of maintaining commandment by the selected forces tweaking the EU engine. Today however, may no longer bear such closed door policies.

This issue may best be suited to a politician and not a lawyer, but what is evident is that the issue is no longer a decision of whether there is a real or perceived deficit in the EU democratic structure but rather the notion that the perception itself represents a clear deficit. The remedy, as suggested, may be a dedication to re-examine any lacking organisational, institutional and systematic clarification that tackles the dark realm which may potentially devour democratic authenticity of the European Union and its institutions

Word Count: 3620

Bibliography

S Douglas Scott. Constitutional Law of the EU (Longman 2002),

Democracy in Europe : the EU and national polities / Vivien A. Schmidt. Oxford Press, 2006

Understanding European Union institutions / edited by Alex Warleigh. Routeledge 2002

The institutions of the EU, Peterson & Shackleton, Oxford Press 2006

A Follesdal, Democracy and the European Union: Challenges, in A. Folllesdal and P. Koslowski (eds),++Democracy and the European Union++, New York: Springer, 1998

Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research Programme, Shifts in Governance: Problems of Legitimacy and Accountability, 2004

Peter Mair, Popular Democracy and EU Enlargement, in East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 17, No.1 (2003)

Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, Multi-level Governance and Democracy: A Faustian Bargain?

Charlemagne, A rigged dialogue with society, in The Economist, 23 October 2004

http://www.nwo.nl/governance/

http://europa.eu.int/>.

“对欧盟的体制结构的一个主要缺陷是，它是从根本不民主的。”

欧共体法律的立法范围内出现的过程是相当复杂的。这种情况的原因之一是，所有的规则和程序立法的条约中规定的不同点。每一个特定的条约规定，在这种情况下，法律的立法基础称为欧共体法律的基础上。第二个原因是，有不同的立法过程及相应的进程取决于条约“的目标，需要立法上的特定区域。

立法的过程中被修改的非常显着，因为原来的条约，作为结果的不同的后续条约。新条约的引入源于早期的立法过程中，有一个所谓的民主赤字，换句话说，这些机构存在的基础上，任命而不是选举控制过程的批评。民主赤字被认为是议会的立法过程，然后提出修改建议收效甚微的作用尤其如此。

在立法过程中主要涉及的3所院校是：

佣金（机构，主要负责提出立法建议和立法草案）

议会（或者有一个咨询的角色，或在某些情况下，可以提出修正）

委员会（体效果是负责通过新的立法

其他机构也发挥有限的作用，在过程中，最引人注目COREPER ，当然，支持安理会通过所有立法。

有4种类型的程序，可在社区的法律秩序。不过，也有有限的情况下，该委员会有权自行立法，还有其他的情况下，理事会和委员会没有咨询议会采取行动，但在实践中，他们仍然这样做。 4个主要过程是：

建议（或协商）过程

的合作程序

共同决策程序

同意的过程。

提案程序是原来的程序，但由于批评是缺乏足够的问责和民主赤字引入一个新的进程，给议会一个更有意义的角色。此过程是的合作操作过程。据介绍，涉及欧洲议会，这将有2个读数草案建议提供一个相对简单的手段。也正是基于对合格的多数投票权由理事会，其主要背景是内部营销措施。然而，使用这个过程中，大部分已被拆除阿姆斯特丹条约“ ，现在仅剩就经济货币联盟（EMU ）

当今占主导地位的过程，然后介绍了。这是共同决定程序。虽然最初非常复杂，它随后被修改为简化起见阿姆斯特丹条约。使用这个程序已经扩大了条约，尼斯和欧盟宪法的设想更广泛使用。

最后领会的过程是类似的共同决定程序。程序之间的差异最显着的是议会的参与。例如根据协商程序，国会只给其立法草案的意见。与此相反，在共同决策程序议会在影响电股份与理事会和对立法的影响更大。

的提案过程中，最准确地代表的概念，它是提出的委员会和理事会，配置。尽管如此，过程仍然依赖于一些与议会磋商，以及地区经济和社会委员会或委员会，讨论与COREPER 。真正咨询的失败，可能构成违反基本程序要求。在此基础上，它可能会导致被宣告无效的措施。罗盖特FRERES SA V局（ ECJ情况下， 138 / 79条） [1980] ECR 3333的重要性是公认的。

这一过程涉及的佣金发送其理事会和欧洲议会的建议，以及（如适用）的委员会之一。该措施不能成为法律之前，议会已经交付了其意见。即便如此，该局已说了算。

“这...有所削弱的事实，没有任何要求，该局考虑议会的意见，也确实给任何理由拒绝它。因此，在咨询过程中的背景下，国会可能不会强迫其意见在理事会作为一个较低的房子在大多数系统“

道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟斯科特。欧盟宪法（ 2002年朗文） ，P118 。

因此，这是更加充分的理由，有一个在行政和法律的民主赤字EC

为了给更大的作用，向议会合作过程是由单一欧洲法案“ （ SEA ） 。

随着近期扩大欧盟在成员国数目，有越来越多的压力，克服复杂的机构决策程序民主赤字日益增长的感知。有内部反思这种担忧是不是在所有的疑问，但到什么程度，这赤字影响联盟成员和个人完全可以分配欧盟内部的体制结构赤字。此外，这篇文章的目的，是找到一个角度来看，在欧盟的能力，以适应社会，政治乃至全球的过程，直接影响欧盟的民主进程的过渡阵列。

为了有效地进行与欧盟民主赤字的讨论必须考虑的宗旨和机构内的角色。呼吁一个统一的欧洲可以追溯到罗马帝国的崩溃。现今统一采取的措施以防止未来战争的可能性与欧盟的贸易和经济上的初始焦点。温斯顿·丘吉尔所恰当指出的，我们必须建立一种欧洲美国在一战后学术青年在苏黎世发表演讲。然而，随着更多的成员国加入欧盟的任务范围扩张，不合宜的确之间流行的民主代表性和扩大发展。

无论是表面上或实际上，一个所谓的民主赤字的论据主要是由于欧盟的体制结构，促进循环决策，决策过程，允许来自欧洲公共领域的投入很少。添加到这一点，我们有一个添加少许的非正式关系的性质谈判发生在一片，并在关键政策决策机构欧盟。总的来说，这将导致一个不到透明和场合的不可预知的政策制定过程中，增大在欧盟范围内的民主赤字的批评者一个完美的环境。因此，需要分析的体制结构，以满足一种根深蒂固的认识，所谓的民主赤字。

国家和多民族欧洲管理程序之间的相似性，每到一个共同的领域的指导意见，并在适当时候，政策和资源分配。可以说，权力和影响力被认为在欧盟内部结构进行划分，尽管它认为，欧洲议会（ EP ） ，部长理事会和委员会之间的权力和影响力是有点不平等分离。这些理事机构的目的是保持检查和维护彼此之间的平衡。会员国的公民有机会影响欧盟政策制定，通过他们选出的官员。最接近的个人指挥决策是通过他们选出的代表向欧洲议会。

如前所述， EP有共同决策权的委员会，它是比较有限的，因为它缺乏约束力的立法权力。这实际上意味着， ，为EP候选人可能能够提出各种想法，但是一旦是在办公室，他们实现他们的计划就没有真正的期望。

[T]他EP本身已经几乎没有作用，在欧盟制定宪法。 EP是合理的重要的一天到一天的政策，在欧盟范围内，当然。但它不携带重量在讨论对欧盟，而不是因为这是国家的政治家和各国政府的事，通过这些理事会和委员会。

尽管这样， EP越来越强调本身，它确实有直接的控制权的事宜上变得越发响亮。近来有证据表明此新任命的内阁委员会通过的反对。

部长理事会由成员国代表组成，是主要立法和决策决策机构欧盟。理事会成员本国议会有必要作出政策。然而，其程序的性质，被视为几乎是偷偷摸摸的，经常被援引住在缺乏足够的成员国贡献。明显，这引进了民主缺乏洞察力理事会的作品内。

除了丹麦和奥地利，成员国不允许本国议会确切承诺的部长理事会会议前，征询他们的意见在会议期间，或持有他们事后交代。

此外，引进合格的多数投票权授权会员国的代表在议会，操纵投票程序达成决定。这可能是根据压缩时限，因此不可避免地会导致堵塞或少数人的意见有时在安理会内否决。

此外，引进合格的多数投票，理事会成员国代表还有权操纵表决程序，有时根据压缩时限，达成一项决定，有时不可避免地导致阻塞或否决权的少数人的意见，在安理会内。

虽然EP必须给予其批准，由理事会提出立法， MEP之间的非正式内部否决权使得决策的影响比较容易。同样，外部否决权理事会权力侵蚀的基石，有效的决策，因为成员国政府不愿意创建一个僵局，因此谨慎地使用否决权。因此，这将是安全的，承担国家和多国程序之间的根本区别可能被盘踞在一个连续的意见少，而是国家或多个国家一级领域内的多数股权分类。

该委员会被授予的权力，批准的法律法规草案的EP和理事会由于被赋予这项权力，他们被看作是欧洲各机构之间的发电厂房。各种组合有关的授权，不同的董事会委员会内部举行的欧洲专员咨询委员会主席由成员国政府选择。起草法律的真正发生闭门适当命名的欧盟官员，他们很少冒险进入该地区委员会的政策可能最终直接影响。由于这一事实，是认为有点物化的民主赤字。

相反成员国的公共领域，最终是要反映在布鲁塞尔的政策制定，卫星组织声称虽然在各自的领域内代表欧洲舆论的大量涌入的意见的协调和互动，有些蓬勃发展在布鲁塞尔的字段。这些卫星组成的顾问是谁在定期接触，成立专门委员会，就特定问题提供指导。出现问题的情况下，他们可能是均匀的脱节，普遍认为他们在委员会的许多同行的程度。

由于欧盟的体制关系的复杂性，公民往往茫然不知所措，在他们获得权利的事宜不感兴趣。当地的民主政体提供了更清晰的定义机构的关系而言，通常由宪法或同样正式框架保存。一方面，人们常常认为，市民需要更多地参与决策过程中发挥更清晰的作用。这是一个合乎逻辑的看法，因为这样的决定的结果直接影响公众和国家利益。相比之下，市民代表由选举产生的官员很少授予或部分市民有什么玩的问题。这通常被定义为宽容的共识。此过程被称为欧洲太复杂的原因，因此或太多的技术，或者甚至是枯燥的，普通选民的关注，它被看作是成为精英的事，经双方同意的结果。

从国家转移到欧洲的治理，研究人员辩称，有导致被冠以什么，这是一种协调的权力下放。此外，改变了传统的决策方法在机构强调过程本身，一些刚才提到的“浮士德式的交易”的堆焊。这种说法的一个最重要的例子是理事会目前采取的方法的共识性。因此，为了更广泛的协议，问责性和有效性是有限的。这造成了巨大的决策最终在欧盟公民和他们的代表之间的差距越拉越大的非正式性质，由于工会内部机构之间的妥协。

一个技术系统，包括跨国公司，国家和次国家机构，公共和私营部门的多种类型的特点是由欧盟实行多层次的治理。非正式谈判和网络之间的多层次的机构定义，幕后关系。这里的关系是不分层定义，但在垂直和水平的水平，而情境。比补充或扩大政府间的做法，而是多层次的安排往往涉及直接与亚国家或地方当局。有人将矛头指向中央，区域和地方当局分离成独立自主的机构，能够直接与欧盟的跨国机构，创建自主联系的有效性。

然而，这些类型的机构网络有更强大的利益相关者，以成功过小，往往经验不足和资源代理的一种方式。这是由于缺乏正规的内在结构，在谈判中欧盟各机构之间，地区或地方的演员。有了这么多的演员和欧盟决策过程中作出贡献的机构，它变得很难保持任何一名球员问责。

内部解决方案，以打击批评欧盟机构内的民主实践缺乏未能克服赤字，或解决的根本原因。这体现在最近任命了一个新的专员处理与外部的通信问题。除了新的专员，其实是一个老委员，只需重新分配或重新委托，她主要关注的焦点集中在建立一个对话或与公民团体集思广益从事公共部门的事实。这可以推断，将创建必要的链接与不满和断开的欧洲公民。

然而，有许多共同影响政策在布鲁塞尔设立的咨询公司和游说团体，许多民间团体直接融资主要是受委托。正如一位评论家指出，委员会的财政支持许多组织：

[...] ，部分原因是因为他们是方便的各种决策的董事会的对话者。假设环境或社会事务总局正在考虑发出新的指令，不想被人看到，考虑到欧洲公民的意见。还有什么能更容易，拿起电话，与当地的非政府组织（委员会资助）安排会议？

这反过来，可能会导致一个相当陈旧或利己的对话或依赖于他们的经济命脉委员会委员会和非政府组织（NGO）之间的头脑风暴。

考虑到多样性的欧洲成员国的人口，与他们不同的利益和需要，它必须承认，多数人的利益的代表是不太可能发生，直到出现一个明确界定的欧洲公共空间。这只会发生一次公民，大型和小型的成员国，新与旧，感觉自己插在它们能够影响感到投资其中概念性的办法，可能会被用来弥补感知的过程，其结果民主赤字，下面可能会提供一个起点：

首先，有效性应当恢复治理过程过于分散，以容纳多样性玩家在维护民主原则和实现有效的决议，政策问题的费用。通过建立一个法律框架，如政制发展进步，刚性的设置将被认可，反过来，将授权更平等地表示所有有分。正式规则，盘踞在宪法原则，保证平等的代表性，对于那些关注。这将破坏欧盟的治理结构，这往往是较为固定的过程比结果，照亮单个角色的欧盟机构向公众的一个主要断裂带。

此外，为了重新建立问责制，并出席在欧盟机构的透明度的问题，组织和谈判的进展应作出正式，不那么强大的球员应该与制度保障，保证他们的公平代表性。这主要是显着的，当铭记访问许多市民由于缺乏实用意识的缺乏，在迷宫中的欧洲机构，在缺乏资源和政治协会配合展开有效的游说行动。为了要做到这一点，附属规则应设防，企图揭露决策过程的所有成员。

此外，作为一个设备，以改善隧道视觉现象所经历的众多欧盟官员委员会，合作替代过程中，委员会官员承诺在一段时间内重新审视自己的领域的问责制，从一个国家的角度来看，应该建立起来。尽管委员会有实习计划作为一种方法的人获得知识的国内机制，其机构有用的工作实践，新的公务员应该捐出成员国都没有自己的时间，虽然在各自的领域内的能力。这将允许公务员熟悉感与公民遇到的问题，并与这些背在布鲁塞尔。

最终，需要循环有关欧盟问题的数据和过程是最重要的，为了建立公众参与纳入了更广泛的讨论。大众媒体的理想设备，并有效地利用反欧盟的敌人。

可大部分公众对欧盟的法眼的困难缺乏相关的信息，即将到来的欧盟机构。可以想象在过去，这可能已被视为一个宝贵的手段保持选定的部队调整欧盟引擎的诫命。然而今天，可能不再承受这样的闭门政策。

这个问题可能最适合的政治家，不是律师，但显而易见的是，这个问题已经不再是决定是否有实际的或可能的赤字在欧盟民主结构，而是概念的看法本身就代表一个明确的赤字。补救措施的建议，可能是一个奉献重新审视任何缺乏组织，体制性和系统性的澄清，铲球黑暗的境界，可能吞噬民主欧盟及其机构的真实性

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参考书目

道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟斯科特。欧盟宪法（朗文2002） ，

民主在欧洲：欧盟和国家政体/费雯丽A.施密特。牛津大学出版社，2006

了解欧盟机构/编辑的由Alex Warleigh 。 2002年Routeledge

欧盟，彼得森沙克尔顿机构，牛津大学出版社2006

A. Folllesdal和P.科斯洛夫斯基（EDS） ， à Follesdal的，民主和欧洲联盟的挑战， + +民主和欧洲联盟+ ，纽约：施普林格， 1998年

荷兰科研计划的组织，转变治理的合法性和问责的问题，2004年

彼得·梅尔，大众民主和欧盟东扩，中东欧国家的政治和社会卷。 17日，第1期（2003年）

盖伊·彼得斯和乔恩·皮埃尔，多层次的治理与民主：一个浮士德式的讨价还价？

查理曼，操纵与社会对话，在“经济学家” 2004年10月23日

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