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Army Training Learning

The Army as a Training and Learning Organisation

Abstract

This essay deals with the challenges faced by the Educational and Training Services in dealing both with modern warfare whilst overcoming the lack of basic skills which is becoming a liability, by evaluating the effectiveness of the forces as a learning organisation.

In order to progress and improve as an Army, Army educators not only have to deal with basic skills shortfalls, but assisting other arms in overcoming cultural problems, in our own country and in the countries in which we are operating. Also, an analysis of how the ETS can deliver the educational needs for a difficult situation, in which not only basic skills but also languages, culture and an understanding of modern war and counter-insurgency techniques are needed. The difficulties faced by the ETS in teaching methodologies in order to over come the wide range of topics and abilities faced by an Army educator both in barracks and on operations are also evaluated in detail.

“What is the good of experience if you do not reflect?” Frederick the Great

Lt N Mazzei

Seminar Paper

The Army as a Learning Organisation

Introduction

1. In order for any organisation to be ‘effective’ it is important for the organisation to identify what its key aims are. Though this may sound obvious, large organisations such as the Army constantly need to identify exactly what its aims are in order to ensure that it is ‘doing the right things’ (Drucker: 1977). In order to do this, it is important to bring together ‘individual motivations, norms and institutional expectations’, as the effectiveness of the organisation is relative to the appropriateness of the situation (Mintzberg: 1979). The Army’s situation right now is one of sustained operations in foreign cultures in support of other nations’ internal security.

It is important to identify this in order to demonstrate how the Army is still focused on a strong strategic level of thought rather than a tactical one. Overall, it is important to evaluate the Army’s capability to ‘learn as an organisation’, a far more difficult demand than many other organisations face.

For all the talk of training and learning amongst the writers of doctrine, makers of policy and practitioners, there is a lack of attention to dealing with the Army as an organisation. Theories of learning rarely appear in professional training programmes for training members of the Armed forces.

Often, the process of learning is overlooked and simply ‘accepted’ as something that just takes place within the training environment, with the correct knowledge being learned just as a matter of course (almost as if it was by some magical osmosis). This failure to deal with the learning process, for individuals but especially as an organisation, will hold back the Army for many years. There is even a lack of resources produced by professional academics who deal on a daily basis with the understanding of ‘learning’ on the development of the human resource within the organisation and the organisation itself and the understanding that this learning may be in a anyway problematic is rarely discussed.

2. Approaches to learning

There are many different approaches to learning, two of which will be used to further our understanding the Army as a learning organisation.

i.Behaviourist Orientation. John B. Watson created the stimulus-response model. In this the environment is seen as providing stimuli to which individuals develop responses. This is very much the current learning process encouraged on the Command, Leadership and Management courses at Education Centres. According to James Hartley (1998) four key principles come to the fore:

  • Activist. Learning is better when the learner is active rather than passive. ('Learning by doing' is to be applauded).
  • Repetition, imitation and practice. Frequent practice - and practice in varied contexts - is necessary for learning to take place. Skills are not acquired without frequent practice.
  • Positive Transactional Approach. Positive re-enforcers like rewards and successes are preferable to negative events like punishments and failures.
  • The setting of clear aims and objectives. ‘By the end of this session participants will be able to'. With this comes a concern with competencies and product approaches to curriculum.

ii. Humanist Orientation. This approach focuses on the potential for humans to develop as individuals, rather than as a scientific approach viewing individuals as objects that can be controlled within variables. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is perhaps the best known example, which also used to the CLM course to assist NCOs in understanding motivation, from physiological needs to self actualization.

The concept requires each level to be fulfilled until progress can be made to the next level. Understanding where learning comes in Maslow’s hierarchy is not clear, though Tennant (Tennant 1997: 13) argues that achieving self actualisation may mean developing humans to what they are capable in which education would play a key role.

  • Theory of Learning Organisations. Two theories which are of particular use in the case of Learning in the Armed Forces will be looked at.

i.The phases of learning (Double and Single Loop Learning). For Argyris and Schön, learning is all about making mistakes, realising those mistakes and then rectifying the problem. They identify two processes to finding solutions to the problem. The first is identified as single loop learning, where a resolution is found without a fundamental change to the structure or underlying theory. This comes from unexpected outcomes that arises from outside the expected ‘norm’ from actions made and are strategies put in place to maintain results within the expected norms Argyris and Schön (Argyris and Schön, 1978: 2).

The norms and expectations themselves remain fundamentally unchanged Argyris and Schön (1978: 2). An alternative response is to question the norms themselves. This is described as double-loop learning. With a change in the values of our set parameters we change the field in which the system seeks to maintain its stability (Ashby, 1960). Strategies and assumptions may change along with theories which affect the individual and the organisation. Chris Argyris’ research has focused greatly on exploring how can increase their capacity for double-loop learning.

Argyris argues that double-loop learning is necessary for institutions and organisations, operating in dynamic, rapidly changing and uncertain contexts, in order to make informed decisions in (Argyris; 1990). This method of learning is highly suitable to a dynamic institution such as the Armed Forces. Single-loop learning, then, presents when goals, values, frameworks and strategies are taken for granted.

The emphasis is on ‘techniques and making techniques more efficient’ (Usher and Bryant: 1989) Reflection is aimed towards making the strategy more effective within the framework and the restraints of the theory. Double-loop learning ‘involves questioning the role of the framing and learning systems which underlie actual goals and strategies’ (Argyris and Schön, 1996).

Argyris added to the single and double loop learning theory (advocated in its rawest form by Ashby) with the inclusion of conventional beliefs about correct behaviour in institutionsand social groups. These governing beliefs can be clustered together in certain world views, and as a result into aspect of organisational learning, within Models, of which Argyris has identified two.

Model 1

  • "Achieve the purposes as the actor perceives them
  • Maximise winning and minimise losing
  • Minimise eliciting negative feelings
  • Be rational and minimise emotionality"

This produces adversarial and defensive action strategies, poor relationships and poor learning (1982, p.86)

Model 2

  • "Valid information
  • Free and informed choice
  • Internal commitment to the choice and constant monitoring of the implementation"

The action strategies are less defensive and more collaborative and are conducive to effective relationships and learning. (1982, p.102). These models, Argyris suggests, demonstrate how organisations enter the learning process and how successful they are at achieving organisational learning. Argyris found that most individuals and organisations will advocate the use of Model 2 values which will benefit the organisation and others.

In other words, it is their ideal aim. However, it is far more likely for individuals to actually occupy Model 1 cultures, due to the competitiveness and culture of independent work ethic that western society exists around. In addition, the Army shows a number of other features which adds to this. (Argyris, 1982)

  • Power is one.  When there are power differences between people, it is often tempting to "solve" problems (or at least dispose of them) by fiat rather than understanding.
  • Specialisation is another.  People pursue the goals of their own position or section or branch, and may thus lose sight of the overall goals.  This makes for competition rather than collaboration between person and person and between section and section. Competition in itself is based only around promotion as there is no room for ‘money making incentives’.
  • Designing organisations around jobs rather than around people is a third.  People are expected to leave at home the more individual aspects of them, including their thoughts and feelings.  A false rationality results. (Argyris, 1982)

Overall, Argyris and Schön’s theories on organisation learning are able to take aspects of both approaches discussed in the opening paragraphs. It is important to recognise that ‘each member of an organization constructs his or her own representation or image of the theory-in-use of the whole’ (Schön, 1978).

This statement shares many hallmarks of both the humanist approach, with Maslow’s perspective included demonstrating how the individual perspective and needs affect the organisation. The behaviourist, with the affect of the organisation guiding the individual is also shown. With encouragement towards the Model 2 culture then organisational effectiveness will push for greater organisational learning.

ii.Communities of practice. This theory explains that all communities and ones of practice, in which all individuals are members of. Wegner and Lave created a model of situated learning which suggested learning involved engagement within a 'community of practice'.  The Army is too a community and within it are methods of practice, varying from culture, humour, training and education. As Wenger explains, “These practices are thus the property of a kind of community created over time by the sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise. It makes sense, therefore to call these kinds of communities, ‘communities of practice’ (Wenger, 1998). According to Wenger (1998), a community of practice defines itself along three dimensions:

  • What it is about – its united aim as understood and continually renegotiated by its members. Though direction for The Army comes from outside, it is certainly united in its goals and methods by it membership.
  • How it functions - mutual engagement that bind members together into a social entity. The Army is a social entity in a far more extreme way than the majority of organisations.
  • What capability it has produced – the shared repertoire of communal resources (routines, sensibilities, artefacts, vocabulary, styles, etc.) that members have developed over time. (Wenger, 1999). The Army would identify itself as a sub-culture within the UK.

Understanding the organisation is key to it developing and learning and so the communities approach has been looked upon with interested in the last 10-20 years which has arisen along with the growth of interest in the learning organisation. This growth pushed the interest of academics towards informal organisational cultures and structures as well as analysing formal structures, both of which exist within communities of practice.

Similarities can be seen with Schön’s and Argyris’ “Models”. The focus of communities of practice however, amplifies the informal rather than the formal aspect pushed by the formal structure within the organisation. The model also focuses on those within the organization and how benefits could accrue to the organization itself, and did not lie primarily with the individual members of a community of practice. This then fits similarly with Argyris’ Model 2.

Within these theories and approaches to learning, we will look at the Army’s success as a learning organisation, focusing on the era of change brought in with the attacks of 9/11, the huge increase in operational activity and the challenges faced by the modern Army. We will identify where these theories fit within the Army’s methods of learning and further more how they can be used to improve the Army’s learning effectiveness as an organisation.

4.The Army as a Learning Organisation

The Terms such as ‘the strategic corporal’ and ‘three block war’ remind us constantly about the need for well educated, well trained and well disciplined soldiers who are able to deal with difficulties that such complex operations present (http://www.publications.parliament.uk: 30/08/07).

Key to dealing with these issues is enhancing the soldier’s decision making capability, so the soldier is better able to over come problems faced, think on their feet and apply their knowledge to deal with situations that they have not been explicitly told how to solve.

Further to this is the need for further and higher education in our soldiers and officers, without which development of our strategic, operational and tactical capability will be severely limited. The American armed forces, after spending thirty years forgetting lessons learnt in Vietnam, has taken the step to educate their soldiers in counter insurgency warfare, with officers reading British counter insurgency manuals.

They have also used books written by academics and former members of the British armed forces, talking of experiences in Aden, Malaya and Northern Ireland. Dealing with asymmetric warfare requires different things from our soldiers from conventional warfare, with culture, language and morality more important than simply applying firepower. Dealing with media and digital communication as well as applying the laws of armed conflict to unfamiliar ground.

Creating change in such an organisation is not simple, The Army, with a stereotype for blindly following commands, a rigid structure and an inability to move outside of its constraints, must change like any other organisation. In order to change, the Army must move forward to face whatever threats it is opposing and further to do this, must learn how it must operate.

This change is not a new process and has been taking place in Britain’s Armed Forces ever since the first military revolution at Agincourt. How we learn as an organisation however, has not changed. Ashby’s concept of single and double loop learning fits neatly into the military structure.

Firstly, most would declare the Army as a double loop system, changing its methods from the bottom up and as such would be regarded by Argyris as a Model 2 organisation. This is certainly not how the majority of military learning operates. The Army would very much be described as a Model 1 organisation, aiming instead to apply resources to resolve problems rather than affect a change in the structure and theory behind their current operations.

For example, much like the Americans experienced in 2003-2006 in Iraq, the British Army increased its force protection and removed itself from the environment it was attempting to control. Further to this, the control the forces were trying to export did not take into account free radicals within the system that were fundamentally uncontrollable, particularly from outside this system. With respect to learning communities, which recognises the importance of informal organisations and structures, the Army was not establishing a suitable environment to allow eventual control of the system.

It’s defensiveness of its methods, stemming from an over-confidence from experiences in Northern Ireland and Bosnia, maintained the Army’s place as a Model 1 organisation, maintained the single loop learning process and so never allowed room for adaptation and innovation.

In order to establish itself as a double loop system, it needs to break away from the Model 1 process and establish itself as a system that welcome innovation. This is not a simple procedure, as the military relies heavily on the system it is used to using. For example, the survival of horse cavalry in military systems around the world demonstrates how difficult innovation is for the military in moving into new systems.

Even though single loop learning would have demonstrated that in the era of industrial warfare the horse was no longer effective, many countries still tried to implement them as useful for mobility in a nuclear conflict (Katzenbach, 1958), another aspect of informal structures and communities of practice affecting innovation and learning. John Nagl, a US Colonel, discussed organisational learning and focused on the differences of the UK and US army’s ability to adapt, learn and innovate. In order to identify any military as a learning institution (In this case, we will call a learning organisation as a Model 2, double loop learner), Nagl lists five questions (Nagl, 2005)

  • 1. Does the army promote suggestions from the field?
  • 2. Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?
  • 3. Does the organisation regularly question its basic assumptions?
  • 4. Are high-ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the ground and open to their suggestions?
  • 5. Are standard operating procedures generated locally and informally or imposed from the centre?

All of John Nagl’s theories of organisational learning fit within the double loop learning process and along with Argyris and Schön’s theories of learning organisations. It is certainly clear that the double loop learning process can be applied to the British Army.

5.The Educators Role.

Within the process of forcing the Army to become a Model 2 organisation (the term forced is used as the culture of the Army is not one of comfortable change) the Educational and Training Services must play a key role. As the ETS restructures itself to fit the Army’s future needs it, it must also recognise itself as a learning institution and become a Model 2 organisation itself. Its roles within CLM, languages and training and development will obviously move with this; however it is in the change of CLM which is key as this is where we will have the most contact with the rest of the Army.

CLM V3 is a severe change from the previous system where we will be required to ‘educate forward’ (a horrendous term) and deliver to the learner at their position rather than expect them to come to us. It also requires a large amount of distance learning on behalf of the learner, putting the pressure of learning on the learner rather than utilising the character of the teacher to promote learning (something Schön was famous for).

This process of moving the education onto the unit and the learner rather than at the heart and soul of the educator is an excellent example of single loop learning. Rather than changing the theory behind what we are trying to achieve, the Army intends to change the course to being delivered by others who are not in the learning process. The pressure of communities of practice will greatly affect the learning process, most likely by hugely increasing the amount of plagiarism by soldiers who do not understand the benefit of the learning to their careers and personal development.

6. Conclusion

This failure to recognise the double loop learning process as a fundamental shift in methodology rather than the method itself will also be reflected on the Army’s practises away from the ETS, especially in the infantry and the combat arms on operations.

The Americans, with their Iraq surge, did more than flood 30,000 more soldiers into Baghdad; they reflected on their previous errors, searched for alternative solutions and implemented the process. They focused less on brute force and more on the mind, with information being the key area they process. Because of the British Army as a community of practice stuck in a process of tradition stemming from hundreds of years of success on operations, we have not been through this same reflection process.

The British Army is without doubt a typical Model 1 organisation with aspirations to be a Model 2 organisation. John Nagl identifies this with his questions on an Army’s ability to ‘innovate’, questions we are not able to successfully answer. Because we are a Model 1 organisation we become defensive when others criticise our actions and often laugh at the Americans attempts at bringing control to a system that has too many variables.

But in this process, the Americans discovered they must create environments for local innovation rather than too force the system to be controlled in the process they wish. Outside of operations, the British Army still relies on the old system of “the organisation learners because we train it”, an ironic position to be in as the Army prides itself on being the most experienced Army in the world. Argyris and Schön identify a process of phases (Argyris and Schön, 1978) through which the Model 2 organisation can be achieved, which Nagl’s process was based upon.

Through this system, it would no longer be necessary for individuals to go full circle on a learning process (such as the OODA loop or Kolb’s cycle) and can amend the process through double loop learning. This will only be achieved once a Model 2 organisation is achieved.

Argyris, C. (1990) Overcoming Organizational Defenses. Facilitating organizational learning, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Harris, A (Open University Press, 2000) Organizational Effectiveness and Improvement in Education.

Hartley, J. (1998) Learning and Studying. A research perspective, London: Routledge.

Litow, A. (1991) Negotiating Teaching/Learning Interactions: A study of Reciprocity in Tutorial Discourse. Dissertation Abstracts International. 52-04, #1313A

Mintzberg, H (1979) The Structuring of Organisations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Petty, G. (Nelson Thornes, 2004) Teaching Today 3rd Edition,

Reece, I (Business Education Publishers Limited 2003) Teaching, Training and Learning

Tennant, M. (1988, 1997) Psychology and Adult Learning, London: Routledge.

Trowler, P (Collins Educational, 1995) Investigating Education and Training

Usher, R. and Bryant, I. (1989) Adult Education as Theory, Practice and Research, London: Routledge.

Wenger, E. (1998) 'Communities of Practice. Learning as a social system', Systems Thinker, http://www.co-i-l.com/coil/knowledge-garden/cop/lss.shtml. Accessed March 03, 2008.

 

陆军训练学习
军队作为一个培训和学习型组织
抽象
这篇文章涉及处理现代战争的基本技能,这是成为一个责任,作为学习型组织的力量的有效性进行评估,同时克服了缺乏教育和培训服务所面临的挑战。
要想进步和提高作为陆军,陆军教育工作者不仅要处理的基本技能不足,但克服文化问题,在我们自己的国家,在我们经营所在国家的协助其他武器。此外, ETS可以如何提供一个困难的形势下的教育需求分析,其中不仅基本技能,但语言,文化和现代战争和平叛技术的了解是必要的。 ETS的教学方法,以克服所面临的一个陆军教育家无论是在军营,对操作范围广泛的主题和能力所面临的困难也进行了详细评估。
“什么是好经验,如果你不反映呢? ”腓特烈大帝
LT N MAZZEI的
研讨会论文
军队作为一个学习型组织
介绍
1。为了任何组织要“有效”是很重要的组织,以确定其主要目的是什么。虽然这可能听起来很明显,大机构,如陆军需要不断确定正是它的目的是为了确保它是'做正确的事“ (德鲁克:1977 ) 。为了做到这一点,重要的是汇集“个人动机,规范和制度的期望' ,为组织效力是相对适当的情况下(明茨伯格: 1979) 。陆军的情况下,现在是一个持续经营业务的外国文化,在支持其他国家的内部安全。
重要的是要找出这个以演示如何陆军仍然集中在强大的思想战略层面而非战术。总体而言,重要的是要评估军队的能力,了解作为一个组织,比其他许多组织面临的一个更为困难的需求。
大家都在谈论的作家学说,政策的决策者和从业人员的培训和学习之中,有缺乏关注与陆军作为一个组织处理。很少出现在训练军队成员的专业培训课程的学习理论。
,学习的过程中,往往被忽视,只是'接受'的东西,仅仅发生在训练环境中,用正确的知识只是作为一个理所当然的事(仿佛是被某种魔力反渗透)了解到。这种故障处理学习的过程中,对于个人,但尤其是作为一个组织,将举行陆军多年。甚至有一个专业的学者,每天打交道的人了解组织内的人力资源和组织本身的发展和理解上的“学习” ,这种学习可能是反正问题所产生的资源缺乏是很少讨论。
2。学习方法
有很多不同的方法来学习,其中两个将被用来进一步了解我们的军队作为一个学习型组织。
i.Behaviourist取向。约翰·B·沃森创造的刺激 - 反应模型。在这种环境是为刺激个人制定应对。这是非常鼓励当前的学习过程上的指挥,领导和管理教育中心的课程。据詹姆斯·哈特利(1998)四大关键原则脱颖而出:
活动家。学习是主动而非被动的学习者更好。 ( “学做”是要鼓掌) 。
重复,模仿和实践。频繁的做法 - 在不同环境下的实践 - 学习是必要的。无需频繁实践技能不能获得。
正交易方法。正重新执法人员奖励和成就一样,是优选的处罚和失败等负面事件。
设定明确的目的和目标。 “本次会议结束,与会者将能够' 。与此而来的竞争力和产品的方法课程的关注。
二。人文主义取向。这种方法侧重于个人,而不是一个科学的态度观看个人为对象变量可以控制在人类发展的潜力。马斯洛的需求层次理论也许是最著名的例子,这也被用来的CLM当然,在理解的动机,协助士官从生理需求到自我实现。
每个级别的概念需要得到满足,直到能够取得进展到一个新的水平。了解学习在马斯洛的层次不清晰,虽然坦南特(坦南特, 1997 :13 )认为,实现自我实现可能意味着发展中国家人类,他们有能力在教育方面将发挥关键作用。
学习型组织理论。定定地看着两个理论都是特定用途的情况下学习武装部队。
一世学习阶段(双人和单环学习) 。对于阿吉里斯和舍恩,学习是所有关于决策失误,实现这些错误,然后纠正问题。他们确定了两个进程,以​​找到解决问题的办法。第一个被确定为单环学习,找到解决没有从根本上改变结构或相关理论。这是来自意外的结果出现预期外的“规范”作出行动和战略落实到位,以保持在预期的规范阿吉里斯和舍恩(阿吉里斯和舍恩, 1978: 2 )的结果。
规范和期望本身基本上保持不变,阿吉里斯和舍恩( 1978年: 2 ) 。另一种反应是规范本身的质疑。这被描述为双回路学习。随着我们设置的参数值的变化,我们改变的领域中,该系统旨在保持其稳定性(阿什比,1960年) 。策略和假设可能随之影响的个人和组织理论。大大集中克里斯·阿吉里斯'研究探索如何能提高他们的能力,双回路学习。
阿吉里斯认为,双循环学习是必要的机构和组织,经营动态,快速变化和不确定的背景下,为了做出明智的决定(阿吉里斯; 1990 ) 。这种学习方法是非常适合的一个充满活力的机构,如武装部队。单环学习,然后,提出目标,价值观,框架和战略时,是理所当然的。
重点是在技术和更高效的制造技术“ ( Usher和科比: 1989 ) ,旨在更有效的战略框架内和理论的束缚,使反射。双循环学习“涉及质疑的角色框架和学习系统的实际目标和战略' (阿吉里斯和舍恩,1996)的基础。
阿吉里斯加入到单,双回路学习理论(主张在其最原始的形式,由阿什比)与传统的信念,正确的行为在institutionsand社会团体列入。可以聚集在一起,这些执政的信念,在一定的世界观,并为组织学习方面的结果,在模型内,阿吉里斯已经确定了两个。
模型1
“达到的目的作为演员感知他们
最大化中奖,并尽量减少丢失
尽量减少引发负面情绪
要合理,尽量减少情绪化“
这将产生对抗性和防御性行动战略,人际关系欠佳,学习差( 1982年,第86页)
模型2
“有效信息
自由和知情的选择
内部承诺的选择和不断监测其实施“
行动策略是防守和更多的合作,有利于有效的关系和学习。 ( 1982年,第102页)。这些机型,阿吉里斯建议,演示了如何组织进入学习过程,以及他们是如何成功地实现组织学习。阿吉里斯发现,大多数个人和组织将倡导使用模型2值,这将有利于组织和其他。
换句话说,这是他们的理想目标。但是,它更容易为个人实际占有模型1的文化,由于竞争力和文化独立的工作伦理,西方社会的周围存在。此外,陆军示出了一些其他的特点,增加了这种。 (阿吉里斯1982 )
电源是其中之一。当有电源人与人之间的差异,往往是诱人的“解决”问题(或至少他们处置)由菲亚特,而不是理解。
专业化是另一回事。人们追求自己的位置,或部分或分支的目标,并可能因此失去视线的总体目标。这使得人和人之间的节和节间的合作,而不是竞争。房间里没有'钱奖励,是基于本身的竞争只能围绕促进。
各地组织设计工作,而不是周围的人,是第三。人们预计请假在家的各个方面,包括他们的想法和感受。假理性结果。 (阿吉里斯1982 )
总体而言,阿吉里斯和舍恩的组织学习理论的是能够在开场段落方面讨论两种方法。重要的是要认识到,每个组织成员的构造他或她自己的表示或图像的整体的使用理论(舍恩,1978) 。
这条语句有许多标志,以人为本的方针,与马斯洛的观点包括证明个人观点和需求如何影响组织。行为主义,组织,引导个体的影响也同时显示。随着对标准鼓励文化,然后组织的有效性将推动更大的组织学习。
实践ii.Communities 。这一理论解释,所有社区和实践的,其中所有个人会员。韦格纳和莱夫情境学习建议学习“实践社区”内参与参与创建了一个模型。陆军是太社区内的方法的实践,不同的文化,幽默,培训和教育。正如温格解释说, “因此,这些做法是一种社会的持续追求,随着时间的推移,创建一个共享的企业的财产。这是有道理的,因此,调用这些类型的社区, “实践社区” (温格,1998年) 。据温格( 1998年) ,一个实践社区定义本身沿着三个维度:
它是什么 - 团结的目的,理解和不断重新协商其成员。军队的方向,虽然来自外部的,那肯定是统一由它的成员在其目标和方法。
它的功能如何 - 相互啮合,绑定成员一起,成为一个社会实体。陆军比大多数组织是一个社会实体在一个更为极端的方式。
它已经产生什么样的能力 - 成员随着时间的推移已经开发的公共资源(套路,情面,文物,词汇,风格等)的共享剧目。 (温格,1999年) 。陆军将识别本身作为一种亚文化在英国范围内。
了解组织发展和学习,所以一直看着社区的方法后,与有兴趣在过去的10-20年,随着学习型组织的兴趣的增长已经出现的关键。这种增长推动学者对非正式的组织文化和结构,以及分析的正式结构,两者都存在于实践社区的利益。
舍恩和阿吉里斯的“模式” ,可以看出相似之处。然而实践社区的重点,放大非正式的,而不是由正式组织内部的结构形式方面推。该模型还侧重于内部的组织和利益如何组织本身应,并没有撒谎主要是一个实践社区的个别成员。这同样适合与阿吉里斯的模型2 。
在这些理论和学习方法中,我们将看看在陆军的成功作为一个学习型组织,关注时代的变化在9/11攻击带来巨大的业务活动的增加和现代军队所面临的挑战。我们将这些理论确定适合在陆军的学习方法和如何进一步它们可以被用来提高陆军作为一个组织的学习成效。
作为一个学习型组织的4军
的条款,如“战略下士”和“三块战争”不断提醒我们需要更多受过良好教育的,训练有素,纪律严明的士兵,谁能够应对困难,这种复杂的操作上(http://www 。 publications.parliament.uk : 30/08/07 ) 。
处理这些问题的关键是提高士兵的决策能力,使士兵能够更好地克服所面临的问题,认为在他们的脚,并学以致用,处理的情况下,他们没有被明确告知如何解决。
此外,这是需要继续教育和高等教育,没有它,我们的战略,战役和战术能力的发展将受到严重限制,我们的士兵和军官。美国的军队,花费三十多年忘了在越南的经验教训后,已经采取步骤来教育他们的士兵在反叛乱战争中,英国反叛乱手册的人员阅读。
他们还使用了由学者和英国军队前成员编写的书籍,亚丁,马来亚和北爱尔兰的经验谈。应对不对称战争,需要不同的东西从我们的士兵从常规战争,文化,语言和道德更重要的不是简单地运用火力。处理与媒体和数字通信以及武装冲突到陌生地运用法律。
建立在这样的组织变化不是简单的,军队,与刻板印象盲从命令,刚性结构和无法移动的制约因素外,像任何其他组织必须改变。为了改变,陆军必须向前迈进,面对任何威胁,它是对立,并进一步做到这一点,就必须了解它是如何运作必须。
这种变化不是一个新的进程,并已发生在英国武装部队自从第一次军事革命在阿金库尔。我们学习如何作为一个组织,但是,并没有改变。 Ashby的概念非常适合单,双回路学习到军事结构。
首先,大多数人会宣布陆军作为双回路系统,改变它的方法从下往上,这样会被认为是阿吉里斯的组织模型。这当然不是广大军事学习如何操作。陆军将非常被描述为模型1个组织,而不是针对应用资源来解决问题,而不是影响其目前的业务结构和背后的理论的变化。
例如,很像美国人在伊拉克经历了在2003-2006年间,英国陆军增加了其力量保护环境,它试图控制自己移除。此外,控制的力试图导出没有考虑到帐户自由基,根本无法控制在系统内,特别是从本系统之外。对于学习社区,认识到非正式组织和结构的重要性,陆军没有建立合适的环境,系统允许最终控制。
它的防卫方法,源于在北爱尔兰和波斯尼亚的经验过于自信,保持军队的地方,模型1个组织,保持单环学习的过程,所以绝不允许的适应和创新的空间。
为了建立自己作为一个双回路系统,它需要,脱离模型1的过程,建立自己作为一个系统,欢迎创新。这不是一个简单的程序,军事在很大程度上依赖于使用它的系统。例如,骑兵在世界各地的军事系统的生存证明,创新是多么困难的军队在移动到新的系统。
即使单回路学习已经证明,在的工业战争时代的马不再有效,许多国家仍然试图实现他们有用的流动性在核的冲突(卡森巴克, 1958年),另一个方面非正式的结构和社区影响创新和学习实践。约翰NAGL ,美国上校,组织学习讨论,并集中在英国和美国军队的适应能力,学习和创新的差异。为了确定任何军事作为一个学习机构(在这种情况下,我们将调用一个学习型组织模型2,双回路学习者) , NAGL列出了五个问题( NAGL , 2005年)
1。军队是否促进领域的建议?
2。有问题上级和政策鼓励下属?
3。定期组织是否其基本假设提出质疑吗?
4 。高级官员经常与在地面上的亲密接触,打开他们的建议吗?
5 。标准作业程序生成的本地和非正式的, ,或强加中心?
所有组织学习适合内双循环学习过程,随着阿吉里斯和舍恩的学习型组织理论的约翰NAGL的理论。这当然是双循环学习过程中,可以适用于英国陆军。
5,教育的作用。
进程内迫使陆军成为一个标准组织(长期被迫作为陆军的文化是不舒适的改变之一)的教育和培训服务,必须发挥关键的作用。由于ETS重组,以适应军队的未来需要,它也必须认识到自己作为一个学习机构,并成为一个标准组织本身。 CLM ,语言培训和发展中的角色将明显移动,但是它是在CLM的变化,这是关键,因为这是我们将不得不与其他接触最多的陆军。
CLM V3是一个严重的变化,从以前的系统,在这里我们将'教育' (可怕的任期) ,并提供给学习者自己的立场,而不是指望他们到我们这里来。它还需要大量的远程学习代表的学习者,把学习者的学习,而不是利用老师的性格,以促进学习(舍恩的东西是著名的)的压力。
移动到单位和学习者,而不是教育家的心脏和灵魂的教育,这个过程是单环​​学习的一个很好的例子。背后的理论,我们正在努力实现的,而不是改变,陆军打算改变课程被交别人谁不是在学习过程中。实践社区的压力将大大影响学习的过程中,最有可能的士兵谁不明白自己的职业生涯和个人发展的学习利益的抄袭量巨大增加。
6 。结论
承认这种故障的方法,而不是方法本身的根本性转变双环学习过程也将被反映在军队的做法远离ETS ,尤其是在步兵作战武器操作。
美国人,他们的伊拉克激增,比洪水30,000更多的士兵进入巴格达,他们反映在他们以前的错误,寻找替代解决方案和实施的过程。他们集中蛮力和心灵上的,过程的关键领域,他们的信息。由于英国的军队作为一个社会进程中的传统源于数百多年的成功经营实践中坚持,我们从来没经历过这种相同的反射过程。
英国陆军毫无疑问是一个典型的模型1组织与模型2组织的愿望。约翰NAGL标识与军队的能力, '创新'的问题,我们是不是能够成功地回答了他的问题。因为我们是一个型号1个组织,我们成为防守的时候,别人批评我们的行动和经常嘲笑美国人企图使控制系统有太多的变量。
但在这个过程中,美国人发现,他们必须为本地的创新,而不是强制系统进行控制的过程中,他们希望创造环境。经营之外,英国的军队仍然依赖于旧制“的组织学习,因为我们培养”,在陆军自诩是最有经验的军队在世界上是一个具有讽刺意味的​​位置。阿吉里斯和舍恩标识的处理阶段(阿吉里斯和舍恩,1978)就可以实现,通过该模型2组织, NAGL的过程根据。
通过这个系统,这将不再是必要的,个人在学习过程中去兜了一圈( OODA循环或科尔布的周期等) ,并可以修改过程中,通过双循环学习。这将只实现一次模型2的组织来实现。
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